Standards

Published authority-grant schema · Download example

{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "grant_id": "GRANT-2026-0142",
  "provenance": {
    "issued_by": "risk-governance-board",
    "issued_at": "2026-03-01T09:00:00Z",
    "basis_summary": "Fraud-hold policy 3.2 adopted with a measured 1.4% false-positive rate on the Q4 backtest; reversal path rehearsed in February."
  },
  "scope": {
    "action_classes": [
      "READ",
      "WRITE"
    ],
    "systems": [
      "core-banking-holds"
    ],
    "populations": [
      "retail accounts, excluding accounts flagged vulnerable"
    ],
    "limits": {
      "max_hold_days": 7,
      "max_holds_per_hour": 120,
      "max_hold_value_usd": 25000
    }
  },
  "issuing_authority": {
    "name": "Risk Governance Board",
    "role": "Delegating authority",
    "contact": "risk-governance@example.org"
  },
  "grantee": {
    "id": "agent-risk-ops-v2",
    "type": "agent"
  },
  "action_classes": [
    "READ",
    "WRITE"
  ],
  "for_whom": "Retail banking customers, on behalf of the Fraud Operations desk",
  "evidence_basis": [
    {
      "ref": "POL-FRAUD-HOLD-3.2",
      "summary": "Hold rules and thresholds for suspected account takeover.",
      "as_of": "2026-06-18T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "ref": "EVID-BACKTEST-2026Q1",
      "summary": "Q1 backtest: 1.4% false-positive rate, median release 31 hours.",
      "as_of": "2026-04-05T00:00:00Z"
    }
  ],
  "assumptions": [
    "False-positive hold rate stays below 2% on the rolling 30-day window.",
    "The Risk Steward can release any hold within two hours of a challenge.",
    "Vulnerable-account flags are current within 24 hours."
  ],
  "review_conditions": [
    "False-positive hold rate exceeds 2% on the rolling 30-day window.",
    "Any challenge decided against the system.",
    "Policy POL-FRAUD-HOLD-3.2 enters review_required or expires."
  ],
  "revocation_conditions": [
    "Holds placed on accounts flagged vulnerable.",
    "Intervention reach time exceeds four hours in any incident.",
    "Withdrawal rehearsal fails."
  ],
  "correction_capacity": {
    "assessed_at": "2026-06-18T16:30:00Z",
    "detection": {
      "present": true,
      "evidence": "Model Risk Review recomputes the false-positive rate and release latency each month from the raw hold log rather than from the Fraud Operations dashboard; the 2026-06 recomputation put the rate on accounts flagged vulnerable at 11% against a 2% assumption. The qualifier is on the record: CHL-2026-0088 was reported from outside by the account's representative, not caught by the monitor, so detection is present but was not first.",
      "evaluator": "Model Risk Review (second line)",
      "independent_of_executor": true
    },
    "challenge": {
      "present": true,
      "evidence": "CHL-2026-0088 was raised on 2026-06-10 by an affected account's representative through the channel REG-ACCOUNT-HOLDS-1 declares for the account_hold class, and was decided rather than left open."
    },
    "standing": {
      "present": true,
      "evidence": "REG-ACCOUNT-HOLDS-1 admits affected_party, corrective_labor, representative, and oversight for the account_hold class, and both decision and grant may be challenged. CHL-2026-0088 was raised on the affected_party basis, from outside the operating team."
    },
    "review": {
      "present": true,
      "evidence": "The Risk Steward on call answered inside the register's PT48H deadline (opened 2026-06-10T14:20Z, deadline 2026-06-12T14:20Z) and referred the grant to the Risk Governance Board, which decided REC-2026-0019 on 2026-06-18. Both the examiner and the clock are named in REG-ACCOUNT-HOLDS-1."
    },
    "authority_to_modify": {
      "present": true,
      "evidence": "REC-2026-0019 narrowed the grant itself: populations now exclude accounts flagged vulnerable and max_hold_days fell from 14 to 7. The examiner changed the grant rather than recommending a change."
    },
    "reversible_transitions": {
      "present": true,
      "evidence": "holds.release reversed every hold in the 2026-05-20 rehearsal and released the CHL-2026-0088 hold within two hours; measured median release is 31 hours (DEP-RISK-OPS-V2-2026-06)."
    },
    "operable_after_correction": {
      "present": false,
      "evidence": "Not shown beyond 48 hours. DEP-RISK-OPS-V2-2026-06 records institutional reversibility as not feasible: withdrawal past 48 hours breaches the card-network fraud-loss SLA and the rules-engine fallback is not staffed to absorb it, with correction latency measured at 31 hours against that 48-hour margin. Capacity is counted only for reversal inside 48 hours, which is why max_hold_days is 7, and under §4.2 the grant may not be expanded until the fallback is staffed."
    }
  },
  "mode": "unattended",
  "state": "allowed",
  "state_history": [
    {
      "from": "none",
      "to": "allowed",
      "at": "2026-03-01T09:00:00Z",
      "reason": "issued",
      "evidence_ref": "POL-FRAUD-HOLD-3.2"
    },
    {
      "from": "allowed",
      "to": "review_required",
      "at": "2026-06-11T10:00:00Z",
      "reason": "challenge",
      "evidence_ref": "CHL-2026-0088",
      "note": "Challenge opened by an affected party over a hold on a recently flagged vulnerable account."
    },
    {
      "from": "review_required",
      "to": "allowed",
      "at": "2026-06-18T16:30:00Z",
      "reason": "challenge",
      "evidence_ref": "REC-2026-0019",
      "note": "Narrowed: populations now exclude accounts flagged vulnerable; max_hold_days reduced from 14 to 7."
    }
  ],
  "attestation": {
    "signed_by": "key:risk-governance-board-2026h1",
    "algorithm": "ed25519",
    "signature": "MEUCIQD8sV3rN0kQ2Jm5Fh7tX1wLpA6yKb9cUe4SgTn2HvZ0dQIgLxO0Q7mWc3KpR8dN2fYj5bHs1aVvT6xCu9eEi4QnA7k=",
    "signed_at": "2026-06-18T16:30:00Z",
    "payload_digest": "sha256:9f2c41ba7e03d58c6a1f0b8e47d29c53a6b1e7d40f92c8a3b6d5e1c7f0a49b82"
  },
  "liability": {
    "accepted_by": {
      "name": "Meridian Retail Group",
      "role": "Operating institution",
      "contact": "legal@example.org"
    },
    "instrument": "Automated Decision Liability Instrument ADM-2026-02, accepted at grant issue and reaffirmed at REC-2026-0019",
    "accepted_at": "2026-03-01T09:00:00Z",
    "carve_outs": [
      "Liability capped at USD 2,000,000 per incident under ADM-2026-02 §7; the cap is recorded so the residual risk above it is visible before an incident rather than argued after one."
    ]
  },
  "until": "2026-12-01T00:00:00Z",
  "renewal_basis": "A fresh backtest on the preceding quarter, the current dependency record, and a withdrawal rehearsal within the last 90 days.",
  "policy_refs": [
    {
      "policy_id": "POL-FRAUD-HOLD-3.2",
      "version": "3.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "intervention_ref": "INT-RISK-STEWARD-1",
  "capability_catalog_ref": "CAT-RISK-OPS-V2-2026-07",
  "dependency_ref": "DEP-RISK-OPS-V2-2026-06"
}